University of Massachusetts Boston

ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Philosophy Faculty Publication Series

Philosophy

1-1-2013

Harmful Beneficence
Lisa Rivera
University of Massachusetts Boston, lisa.rivera@umb.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/philosophy_faculty_pubs
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Rivera, Lisa, "Harmful Beneficence" (2013). Philosophy Faculty Publication Series. Paper 1.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/philosophy_faculty_pubs/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact
library.uasc@umb.edu.

Harmful Beneficence

(forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy)

Lisa Rivera
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts, Boston
100 Morrissey Blvd.
Boston, MA 02125
617-306-1465
lisa.rivera@umb.edu

Harmful Beneficence

Beneficence can be significant to moral action but criteria for good beneficence is rarely
discussed. Much work has focused on how extensive the demands are on agents to be beneficent and on
agents’ motivations for beneficence.1 There has been little direct attention to the relationship between
benefactor and beneficiary. The argument here is that serious deficiencies exist in the view that
benefactors should focus primarily on satisfying another’s self-chosen ends. A narrow focus on the
attempt to help someone satisfy her ends misses the harmful effects that benefactors can have on a
dependent beneficiary's ability to choose freely from her own values and to utilize her internal and
external resources in future action.
This paper will argue that beneficence that involves a relationship of dependence between
benefactor and beneficiary cannot aim only at promoting that beneficiary's good, narrowly conceived as
meeting her self-chosen ends; it must also preserve the current conditions that the beneficiary depends on
for her free agency. A concern for free agency in beneficence goes beyond whether one satisfies
someone’s freely chosen ends and respects her internal capacity to set ends. It must also involve the
beneficiary’s overall conception of her good and the resources she depends upon in realizing that
conception. When a benefactor fails to understand or respect the larger set of values a beneficiary may
have, fails to account for a beneficiary’s fuller conception of her own good, or disregards the wider side
effects of her action, the choice of means that benefactor uses are much more likely to undermine the
beneficiary’s independently controlled resources. When a beneficiary depends on these resources for
future choices, these side effects can undermine her free agency in the future.
1

Questions about the proper motive for beneficence are raised in Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of
Modern Ethical Theories” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 453-466; Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics
Almost Without Apology, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). For work on how demanding
beneficence should be, cf. Richard J. Arneson, “Moral Limits on the Demands of Beneficence?” in The
Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, Deen K. Chatterjee, ed. (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 33-58; Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Hurley, “Fairness and Beneficence,” Ethics 115 (2003),
pp. 841-864.
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Free agency is understood here as a person's unimpeded ability to deliberate about her values, to
choose from those values, and to make those choices effective in action. The thinner notion of free agency
overlaps with the thicker notion of autonomy; below, I will draw on ideas about autonomy that are
relevant to the more minimal notion of free agency.2
Free agency is often a clearer objective than autonomy when we interact with others, particularly
in cases of beneficence. It is often hard to know whether another person has satisfied the necessary
criteria for autonomy on many views. More importantly, we have much less power to influence—for
better or worse—some of the psychological conditions necessary for others’ autonomy.3 We can,
however, have a significant influence on the conditions for someone's free agency. Our ultimate hope
should be that others are fully autonomous, and we must do what we can to preserve and respect their
autonomy. However, a focus on free agency more directly aims at the basic idea that (barring exceptional
circumstances) we must prevent our actions from impeding a person's freedom to control her own life.
Although a person's deliberation is also to some extent private, there are still many familiar ways we can
impede free deliberation and choice. We may directly or indirectly threaten a person, manipulate or bully
her, induce guilt or shame, threaten to withhold something she desperately needs, or cause her to regard
the help we offer as conditional on her acceptance of the values we prefer. If we do so, it is not farfetched to suppose we tamper with her ability to make her own choices. The argument below will
consider more subtle influences one person can have on another's deliberation and also show that a focus
on free agency makes clearer the relationship between the set of options a person has and her freedom.

2

The intersection between free agency and autonomy entails that impeding someone's free agency is
impeding her autonomy. We can also promote someone's autonomy by promoting her free agency, but
there may be conditions for autonomy that promoting free agency leaves untouched. The point is that
autonomy is a broader notion than is necessary here.
3
For example, a number of views of autonomy require certain procedures for choice that involve
reflection and/or endorsement. Because these are dependent on private mental states, our ability to tell
whether another person has satisfied these criteria is minimal. Although we can encourage others’
reflection and endorsement, it will be very difficult for one person to directly promote these in another.
For a general account of what different views of autonomy require, see Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy,
Gender, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 19-25.

2

I will begin with a minimal conception of beneficence. An action is beneficent if it is intended to
benefit another person with an aim to enhancing her good, primarily by satisfying her desires, helping her
realize what she values, meeting her needs, promoting her interests or protecting her from harm. A
beneficent agent's intention to promote the beneficiary’s well-being is a substantial part of her reason for
acting. Beneficence has moral content. The auto mechanic who fixes your car helps you realize one of
your ends, but her action is not beneficent when her reason is simply to do her job and be paid for it. At
the same time, she might beneficently fix your headlight for free when she realizes you have emptied your
checking account to pay for repairs on your clutch.
Typically, the kind of beneficence we most admire also involves an attitude of benevolence in the
form of goodwill, care and concern, and the agent's interest in the beneficiary's well-being.4 Beneficence
need not be benevolent to be good beneficence. The argument here applies both to benevolent and nonbenevolent beneficence but, in the main example I offer below, Albert Schweitzer is benevolent.
Benevolence offers benefactors a strong motive to attend to the effects of their actions on beneficiaries,
but the example shows that it does not necessarily protect beneficiaries from harm to their free agency.
Obviously, a benefactor who is malevolent, callous, or negligent is more likely to fail at good
beneficence. However, well-intentioned and benevolent benefactors are very capable of inadvertently
doing significant harm.
I am concerned here with non-paternalistic beneficence, where the ends, needs, interests,
protection and so on are all chosen by the beneficiary herself, and she welcomes the beneficent action.
Even in such cases, I will argue beneficence can fail in a crucial respect when the benefactor is
insufficiently aware of the harmful effects his actions have on the beneficiary's options for future
deliberation and action. This is true whether or not the beneficiary does enjoy some benefit from the
action. Section One contains a definition of the type of dependence that occurs most often in beneficence,
4

Some discussions of benevolence include benevolent action, or what I am calling beneficence, within
the concept of benevolence. Cf. Yuval Livnat, “On the Nature of Benevolence,” The Journal of Social
Philosophy, 35 (2004), pp. 304-317. The distinction between beneficence and benevolence is meant to
highlight the fact that some beneficence does not include benevolence.
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and offers an example of harmful beneficence. Section Two presents conditions for good beneficence:
beneficence that preserves free agency and shows respect for beneficiaries.
1. Beneficence and Dependence
I focus on beneficence that involves a relationship of dependence between benefactor and
beneficiary. Dependence is frequently a significant feature of beneficence. Those most in need of help are
often required to depend on others to satisfy their central ends. If the free agency of dependent
beneficiaries is threatened by beneficence, this raises a serious question for moral theories that require us
to help those who cannot meet their own needs. The conditions for good beneficence offered here show
that harmful beneficence in cases of dependence can be avoided, although this requires more of agents
than is often assumed.5
The argument is not that free agency is more likely or enhanced when a person relies on herself to
satisfy her ends. Few people can satisfy all their ends without help from others. Dependence is a
necessary part of many relationships we deeply value. There is nothing inherently desirable about
avoiding it.
Dependence is a matter of degree. In the weakest sense, we are always dependent on others not to
interfere with us as we carry out our ends, and almost always dependent upon them to cooperate with us.
The more robust form of dependence within beneficent relationships is the dependence an autonomous
person, P1, has when first, P1 believes it necessary that someone besides herself, P2, contribute to the
realization of a central element in P1’s conception of her own good (that is, P2’s action is a necessary
means to a central end P1 has). Second, P1 does not have recourse to other sources that would provide
comparable means to the end (that is, P2’s action is the sole means currently available). Third, P1 has an
expectation that her end will be satisfied by P2’s particular action or set of actions. Thus, a relationship of
robust dependence exists in beneficence when P1’s good is significantly affected by the actions of another
person, P2, and P1 necessarily relies on P2 for this result. Dependence of this kind can occur between
5

The harms described here may occur when dependence is not present. Dependence is not necessary for
these harms, but it increases the risk.
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strangers but also occurs in personal relationships, for example, between friends, parents and children,
long-term partners, or teachers and students. Material needs that a person cannot satisfy through her own
agency can be the cause of one person’s dependence on another, but this is not the only dependent
relationship that is appropriate for beneficence. Someone may be beneficent by providing us with
information we need to act, or helping us realize which ends would better promote our own good.
Beneficence involving dependence is neither better nor worse than beneficence where a
beneficiary’s acceptance of help is optional—in the sense that her end is less pressing (and therefore not a
central end) or she has recourse to other means to her end. Nor does beneficence always involve robust
dependence. We can help someone to lighten her burden or show concern for her even when she could
help herself. When someone’s beneficence also involves your dependence it is because you cannot refuse
that beneficence except at some significant cost: You cannot realize the end without the help that is
offered (unless you get similar help from someone else). Thus, you are not robustly dependent on me
when I give you advice on caring for your premature infant if you can get that information on your own.
But if you depend on my beneficence alone to adequately care for, feed, clothe or inoculate your baby,
you do become so dependent.
How can beneficence undermine free agency? The example that follows has features that are not
uncommon when beneficence is called for: A beneficent agent with expertise and access to resources, and
beneficiaries whose poverty and oppression make it hard to realize their ends. The very features that make
a person greatly in need of beneficence also make her more vulnerable to a loss of free agency, when her
resources are damaged and her options are narrowed.
The Alsatian doctor Albert Schweitzer, as portrayed in the movie Le Grand Blanc de Lamberéné,
dedicates his life to benefiting the people living in Gabon. Although he is less famed now, in his time
Schweitzer was thought of by many in Europe and the Americas as a great humanitarian and a
paradigmatic benefactor. The film portrays Schweitzer as a sympathetic, but ultimately tragic, figure. We
see that, although Schweitzer's actions do unjustified and unnecessary harm to the free agency of
beneficiaries, he makes significant sacrifices to be of service to the Gabonese, has deeply benevolent
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feelings towards them, and successfully helps them satisfy some of their central ends, by providing health
care and other material aid.6
The problem with Schweitzer's actions is not primarily paternalism, understood as providing
benefits to a person that she would refuse or reject, or as benefiting someone unable to make a free or
informed choice.7 The Gabonese adults in the film are able to make free and informed choices and they
welcome Schweitzer’s medical treatment and material aid. Schweitzer does engage in one major act of
paternalism: He gives the tribal leader Mata a placebo, rather than telling him that he is dying. This
assuages Mata's fear and temporarily alleviates his suffering, but also prevents him from adequate
preparation for his funeral ceremony. Otherwise, Schweitzer does not force the Gabonese to accept help
that they do not want and does not directly contravene their choices.
Nevertheless, Schweitzer's beneficence creates a significant difficulty for some, particularly with
respect to the goal of political independence. The film presents political independence as important to
almost all the Gabonese, even if some concealed their approval of it to avoid annoying Schweitzer.
Schweitzer was not opposed to anti-colonialism on principle. Rather, he did not understand its importance
to the Gabonese and occasionally displayed a kind of annoyed bafflement about their passion for it.
One issue of conflict concerned resources. Schweitzer resisted the desire of the local people for
greater control over the clinic, and, in spite of his sympathy for their suffering, he was not sympathetic to
their hope to acquire the skills he himself had. Thus, one issue is that he did not fully appreciate their
desire to develop and exercise their own talents. A second issue is that Schweitzer's beneficence causes a
division in the community between those who sought the material goods from Europe that he provided
and those who thought it better, for economic and political reasons, to focus on economic self-sufficiency.
One problem for those accepting the goods Schweitzer offered is that they became less focused on
meeting their own economic needs and they were not able to engage in the usual economic give and take
that they had traditionally relied upon as subsistence farmers prior to Schweitzer's arrival. By giving up
6

Le Grand Blanc de Lambéréne, directed by Bassek ba Kohbia, 1995. I do not claim that the film
represents the historical Schweitzer correctly.
7
Cf. Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism,” The Monist (56), 1972, pp. 64-84.
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the cooperative and reciprocal agricultural practices they had previously engaged in, their standing
entitlement to the assistance of others was severely weakened. As they were ultimately interdependent
with others in the larger community even with the goods Schweitzer provided, this later put them at a
disadvantage. It became harder for them to realize their ends when others, who now mistrusted them,
refused their cooperation. Further, surrounding communities who were focused on the self-sufficient
model became alienated from those perceived of as relying on Schweitzer. In losing the help of these
communities, those close to Schweitzer lost a significant resource they needed after the colonial period,
when self-sufficient farming became the primary economic option.8
Schweitzer's inability to recognize the importance of eliminating colonialism to those around him
was a major failing. Beneficiaries' needs and ends are nested within the broader context of their lives.
Ignoring or misunderstanding this context is a hazard for both benefactors and beneficiaries. In
Schweitzer’s case, the issues that arose about how to develop and use resources can be explained by the
desire of the colonized for economic self-sufficiency and political self-respect. One aspect of colonial
rule—in Africa and elsewhere—was the view that those ruled were inferior to Europeans and thus
incapable of economic and political self-determination. Further, the colonial economic system was
designed to provide raw material for European economies. Cheap raw materials were sent to Europe but
colonies depended on expensive imports of finished goods. Those hoping for self-rule therefore believed
that economic self-sufficiency through a focus on providing for their own needs would facilitate political
independence by removing economic dependence on Europe. Thus, those within the movement aimed to
remove not only the external causes of incapacity, such as economic dependence on Europe and European
political domination, but also to overcome internalized conceptions of inferiority. These goals were
linked, in that economic self-sufficiency, particularly during the transition away from colonialism, would

8

Dependence on material aid can make beneficiaries vulnerable to later economic changes. E.g., this
occurs when food provided for famine relief competes with locally grown food. The drop in prices can
sometimes make it impossible for farmers to raise the money they need to plant for the next year. See
Frances Moore Lappe, World Hunger: Twelve Myths (New York: Grove Press, 1998), p. 134.

7

both increase the possibility of independence and also decrease the sense of internalized inferiority that
colonialism caused.9
In this context, why did Schweitzer provide inadequate and harmful beneficence in spite of his
clear desire not to harm those he worked for? The explanations are interrelated. First, Schweitzer had an
extremely limited understanding of the Gabonese perspective, their culture and way of life, their values
and the place of some of their values in their overall conception of their good. Bassa, a character close to
Schweitzer, points out that although Schweitzer has treated thousands of patients, he has made no attempt
to learn their language. He made insufficient effort to understand the particulars of people’s lives and this
kept him from seeing the wider effect his actions had on those lives. Second, Schweitzer does not attend
to the possible psychological impact that his relative wealth and power might have on those with far
fewer options. He unintentionally leaves some with the belief that his beneficence would be more secure
if they complied with his preferences, for example by not openly supporting the anti-colonialist
movement.
I have so far focused primarily on benefactors, but to understand the impact of dependence in
beneficent relationships on free agency, it is also necessary to consider the effects on the beneficiary. The
limitations on options that make beneficence so important to beneficiaries also threaten to lead to even
narrower options in the future when the benefactor's action impedes the use of other resources. When
beneficiaries are dependent, beneficence sometimes interferes with their internal (self-respect,
confidence) or external (economic, social or political) resources. It is well known that international aid to
underdeveloped countries sometimes fails when the aid has an analogous type of unintended side effect
on resources. 10
9

Cf., Edmund J. Keller, “Africa in Transition: Facing the Challenge of Globalization, Harvard
International Review, (29), 2007, pp. 46-51; Valentine Udoh James, “The Importance of Self-Sufficiency
To African Countries”, in Valentine Udoh James, Sustainable Development in Third World Countries:
Applied and Theoretical Perspectives (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishers), pp. 142-154; Zine
Mugabane, Bringing The Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
10
Cf. Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (New York: Zed
Books, 2002).
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A second aspect of the problem is less often noticed: the benefactor's choice can have effects on
the beneficiary's resources (whether deliberate or inadvertent) that can interfere with the beneficiary’s
ability to freely deliberate and choose. Below, I will argue that perhaps the most worrying effect of
Schweitzer's beneficence was its effect on the deliberative process of those he tried to help. When
beneficiaries have limited resources, dependence can threaten their deliberative options in three ways: by
restricting their autonomy of action, by interfering with the formation of choices, and by reducing their
self-esteem.
First, dependence can impede our ability to act, for example if we unnecessarily give up one
resource in order to acquire a resource through beneficence. Losing one resource for another may not
always be problematic; sometimes such shifts in resources can have long-term benefits. It can be a harm
when it occurs unnecessarily, for example when it is not a necessary condition for the benefit received but
occurs because the benefactor fails to recognize his impact on resources. A reduction in our options can
also affect deliberation. When circumstances frequently frustrate the realization of our ends or
significantly narrow our options, this can sometimes affect our capacity to deliberate freely and choose in
the future.
In understanding how some kinds of dependence can undermine free agency, it is useful to draw a
further distinction between what Gerald Dworkin calls autonomy of judgment and autonomy of action,
two notions closely related to what I have called free agency.11 Autonomy of judgment is the free exercise
of the capacity that allows one to both judge and choose. It is therefore incompatible with brainwashing,
hypnosis, compulsion, deceit, insanity and anything else that interferes with the voluntary status of an
agent’s judgment. Autonomy of action is the freedom to follow the course one has decided upon. It is
usually assumed that autonomy of judgment is a prerequisite for autonomy of action, but less noticed are
the complex ways these interrelate. Loosely, autonomy of judgment is the absence of internal constraints
on a person’s deliberation and choice, and autonomy of action is the absence of external constraints on
11

Gerald Dworkin, ‘Moral Autonomy,’ in Morals, Science and Sociality, T. Engelhardt and D. Callahan,
eds. (Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1978), pp. 156-170.
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her actions.12 Thus, a political prisoner might still have autonomy of judgment. She can autonomously
judge that her imprisonment is unjust, that it is carried out by an unjust regime, and that, when she is free,
she will work to overthrow that regime. However, she does not have autonomy of action. That form of
autonomy has been restricted by her jailers.13
We can conceptually separate the notions of autonomy of action and judgment, but they are
importantly interdependent. The negation or absence of one affects the presence of the other. What is
most relevant to the issue of dependence is that the belief that you lack autonomy of action often erodes
your autonomy of judgment. The expectation that you will rarely (or never) get to carry out your ends or
act on your values can have a serious effect on your deliberative process. To take a case that does not
involve beneficence: If I believe, like Charlotte Vale in Now, Voyager, that I am doomed to spend my life
placating my ill domineering mother for fear any rebellion will cause her to disown me or to die, I am
unlikely to formulate many independent projects if I regard such projects as impossible to carry out.14
When there are extreme, seemingly insurmountable constraints on my range of options, it may be more
rational to resign myself to my circumstances to avoid the depression and frustration the absence of
freedom causes. Gradually, situations where our options are exceedingly narrow can erode our
willingness to reflect on other possibilities or to develop plans and values of our own.
Long-term restrictions on political and social freedom can also erode our inclination to deliberate
freely and to act on our decisions. Perhaps this is why autonomy of judgment receives much more
theoretical attention in the philosophical literature: in a sense, it is what gives autonomy of action its
12

See also S.I. Benn, ‘Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society (1976), pp. 109-30.
13
Locke famously claims that a person held in prison with the door unlocked is not free when someone
has caused him to believe that the door is locked and thus he cannot escape. Such a person lacks
autonomy of judgment and thus autonomy of action. When Odysseus chooses to be bound to the mast in
order to hear the Sirens without jumping overboard, he has autonomy of judgment without autonomy of
action. (Later, upon hearing the Sirens, he lacks both sorts of autonomy.) Locke’s example shows that we
should assume a fairly wide notion of constraint when considering autonomy of action. A person is
constrained from acting not only when she is forcibly prevented from acting, but also when she lacks the
resources, both epistemic and material, to act. Unless this wide notion of constraint on freedom is granted,
we would have to say that a person trapped at the bottom of a well is free to rise to the surface, because
she could do this if she had a ladder.
14
Now, Voyager, directed by Irving Rapper, 1942.
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importance. We tend to be troubled by restrictions on autonomy of action when a person is capable of
thinking and deciding for herself. Yet, an agent who has autonomy of judgment can conceivably exercise
it even when a range of actional options is temporarily closed to her.15 Schweitzer had a similar effect on
the autonomy of judgment of some Gabonese. The background condition of colonialism already impeded
their options, but his beneficence unnecessarily made things worse for them, even if he also helped them
in certain respects.
Those most attached to Schweitzer's beneficence were reluctant to consider participating in the
anti-colonialist movement, in spite of their underlying sympathy for the cause. They feared doing so
would risk Schweitzer's ire and thus his continued medical and material help. Some also wanted to avoid
seeming ungrateful. The goal of greater economic self-sufficiency, which was part of the movement, also
presented a dilemma to those who felt dependent on Schweitzer's largess: what if he withdrew his help
and they lost the European goods he offered? What if the movement failed and he was no longer available
to protect them from hunger in their new way of life? They would be much worse off. Thus, they felt
unable to deliberate fully about options they might have had were they free from these concerns about
losing Schweitzer's favor or seeming ungrateful.
Why, we might ask, did they not directly ask Schweitzer to promise to continue his beneficence,
or that he not favor those who were not openly political? A problematic feature of relationships of
beneficence in cases of economic or other kinds of inequality is that negotiation is very risky for
15

The argument here is not that lack of autonomy of action immediately forecloses autonomy of
judgment, but that most adults will not form ends they regard as unrealizable. We form ends in light of
our options. When our options narrow significantly in the sense that our power to act is curtailed, as when
we have few resources, we have much less reason to reflect on choices. However, even when our
autonomy of action is restricted, we can exercise autonomy of judgment in forming attitudes about our
lives. Further, retaining autonomy of judgment can be important in cases where liberty is restricted
because one may have later opportunities to resist these restrictions. Slaves in the American South
provide a significant example. By utilizing a small range of autonomy of action (for example, by learning
how to read) during their captivity, they often increased their opportunity for escape, as well as their
opportunity to work towards the liberation of other slaves. See Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class
(New York: Random House, 1981); Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (New
York: Collier, 1962). At the same time the restriction on options also made avoidance of reflection on
choices a kind of survival strategy for many slaves, as explored by Tony Morrison in Beloved (New York:
Knopf, 1987).
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beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are aware they have no right to the goods the benefactor offers. Negotiation
may be unwise when those benefactors are the only secure means to one's ends. This problem can be
addressed, but only when benefactors are sufficiently aware of the effects of their attitudes and actions.
Beneficence that involves dependence can interfere with the beneficiary's formation of values and
choices. While it is exacerbated by restrictions on autonomy of action, this effect can also occur when
autonomy of action is not directly curtailed. In such situations, this happens in three ways: it affects the
preferences of the dependent person, it interferes with her reflection on and choice of values, and it
reduces her self-esteem.
The first effect that beneficence can have on deliberation is that the goods offered or promised
(for example, health care, food, education, and access to technology) potentially affect the future
preferences of those who receive them. While this is not immediately problematic, it can become so if the
future satisfaction of these preferences creates too great an incentive for the beneficiary to relinquish
resources she currently relies on to realize what she values. For example, to give the Kayapo Indians of
the Brazilian Amazon the opportunity to document a plight partly caused by settlers’ encroachment on
their land, the owner of the Body Shop chain gave them a television and video equipment. They had not
been exposed to television and had no access to it, and so they sold some land to buy a satellite dish. The
suggestion here is not that the Kayapo did not make their choice freely. However, if they were to
impoverish themselves to satisfy present preferences they could curtail their future autonomy of action.
A second effect that undermines free agency is that the great need for certain goods, combined
with the benefactor’s (unstated or even unconscious) expectation that the recipient will take up particular
values and attitudes, can interfere with the beneficiary’s deliberation in several ways: (a) he may not
reflect adequately on his values and attitudes out of concern that doing so would lead him to display
values and attitudes the benefactor will disapprove of; (b) he may not believe he is free to choose his own
values and ends without penalty (e.g., the loss of beneficence); or (c) he may decide to adopt values and
attitudes he believes will better secure the benefactor's inclination to benefit him, e.g., because such
values and attitudes will make the benefactor more likely to approve of him or take an interest in him.
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In the Schweitzer case, the recipients of his generosity developed a feeling of gratitude and
loyalty toward Schweitzer. This made it difficult to disagree with him when their values and ends
conflicted with his own personal values (for example, regarding politics or social mores) or with his
conception of their situation. When the beneficent agent is offering a good that greatly increases wellbeing (e.g., clearly rising living standards, greater social status) or something nearly impossible to forego
(e.g., protection of one’s children against deadly disease) the beneficiary will have a greater—and harder
to resist—incentive to display the attitudes and values that might please the agent.
Even when we are not desperate for survival, mere social interdependence can have a problematic
effect on our values. It is fairly common, for example, for people to unreflectively internalize values that
will make them successful with others, e.g., their employers. However, relationships of dependence can
affect values even more profoundly when people have very minimal power in comparison to those they
depend upon and they lack the needed resources to change their situation. This can be illustrated by
imagining how the ‘Deferential Wife’ described by Thomas Hill ended up in her predicament. Although
this is not a case of beneficence, it illustrates the penalty on free choice that another person can exact
when we are dependent on them and have few other options. As Hill describes the Deferential Wife, she
is “utterly devoted to serving her husband.” So,
She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever
he is in the mood…She loves her husband but her conduct is not simply an expression of love.
She is happy, but she does not subordinate herself as a means to happiness…On the contrary, she
tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and when she does she counts them as less
important than her husband’s.16
In my re-imagined version of the example, the Deferential Wife was once a young woman who
desired economic security, a socially accepted form of sexual companionship, social status, and freedom
16

Thomas Hill, “Servility and Self-Respect,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), p. 5. Hill’s example is not about the effects of dependence but about the absence
of self-respect. My addition to the example shows that the abuse of power within dependent relationships
can cause loss of self-respect for the dependent person.
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from unwanted sexual advances, but could only satisfy them through marriage to a husband who could
provide them. Unfortunately, the seemingly jovial fellow she married soon turned out to be the
Domineering Husband. As she gets older, the Domineering Husband threatens to leave her when she fails
to reflect his values and meet all his needs. Since she fears losing the benefits of the life with her husband,
and the life of a middle-aged divorcée involves economic hardship and loss of social status, she begins to
display the attitudes and values that will maintain the relationship. After a while, she no longer bothers to
reflect on her adopted interests, values or ideals or those she might develop independently of her husband.
Her acquired values, combined with her belief that she cannot realize her aims (or perhaps even survive)
without him, cause her to adopt the belief that the proper role of a woman is to serve her family.17
Applied to beneficence, the Deferential Wife example illustrates a danger of beneficence
involving dependence, particularly under the conditions of inequality that are likely to exist between
benefactors and beneficiaries. This potential for distortion of beneficiaries’ deliberative process relates to
a well-known problem in humanitarian aid. The heads of foreign non-governmental aid organizations in
the Third World may be more likely to assist those they regard as sharing their political or religious
outlook; this naturally increases incentives for people to adopt that outlook. Particularly when people are
desperate, their perceptions of benefactors’ beliefs, values and attitudes can alter the sorts of plans and
values they adopt so that they conform to the (real or perceived) expectations of their benefactors.
The concern that one person's actions may change another person's values in ways they would not
endorse requires significant qualification. Our values can be changed in ways that are not the immediate
result of reflective rational processes, for example through experiences or through exposure to those with
different values. In other words, we may not endorse changes to our values until they have already
changed, e.g., as a result of personal experience or information about alternatives. Nor are all actions
intended to change others' values disrespectful of free agency or otherwise problematic. Education, for
example, may change people's values—note how people who benefit from the oppression of others fear
certain kinds of education. Thus a change in values, per se, is not a serious worry from the point of view
17
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of free agency; attempts to change people's values can respect and even enhance free agency when they
do not involve manipulation or unjust coercion, and instead rely on persuasion, education, or widening
their set of experiences.
A further objection arises, however: some people's values may be disturbing enough to justify our
pressuring them to change those values or offering them incentives within beneficence to change those
values. Sometimes this issue is easily resolved. Often, no good can come from a beneficent relationship
with someone whose values are repellent. And there is, of course, no duty for benefactors to act contrary
to their own values. In other cases, we may want to help people but find it impossible to respect some of
their values. Some people value norms, roles and practices that oppress women. Or, a benefactor may
work in a community that practices female genital mutilation. Both of these undermine women's free
agency. If our role as a benefactor gives us a certain power and influence over people is it wrong for us to
pressure them to change oppressive values and practices in order to promote someone else’s free agency?
Note that an attempt to change the practice of female genital mutilation within communities would be for
the immediate benefit of children even if the harm occurs throughout their adult life, making this
primarily a kind of paternalistic beneficence. The wide influence a benefactor may sometimes have over
people’s lives can enable such acts of paternalism, even when the primary beneficence is not paternalistic.
The problem here lies not in the failure to respect whatever value people see in female genital
mutilation or oppressive practices generally; values that cause harm to others are not worthy of respect.
Instead, efforts that entirely bypass people's free agency are usually doomed to fail and may even be
hazardous for those one hopes to benefit. Providing incentives to parents not to mutilate their daughters
could potentially protect the daughters, but could lead to other harms: both children and parents could
suffer violence at the hands of those who support the practice or the daughters could be abandoned by
their parents or ostracized by their community.18 Pressure, or even shaming, might induce people to adopt
18

It’s tempting to say that a person fleeing genital mutilation is better off away from their community. In
some cases, they might be. However, it is only in truly extraordinary cases where women in this situation
have other resources or options. Unless one is able to provide these, an action to prevent the practice of
FGM has to take into account these potential harms. It is very difficult for women to get political asylum
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other values, but this process, to be successful in removing harm, requires a change in behavior. This will
not occur unless they eventually come to endorse the value. A more reliable way to address people's
desire to engage in practices harmful to women will almost invariably require that some (particularly the
women) be willingly involved and committed to this goal. Here, the responsibility to fully understand
people’s circumstances and attend to the likely effects of certain actions on their lives is indispensable.
Something similar can be said about a benefactor’s attempt to address the oppression of women.
In principle, it is not objectionable to state one's honest disapproval. Disagreeing with people is not
necessarily disrespecting them, particularly when it is clear we will we not penalize them for their views.
A trickier issue arises when people attempt to give or withhold desperately needed resources in order to
pressure people into transforming their values or when beneficiaries fear they might lose benefits as a
result of benefactor disapproval, as in the Schweitzer case. It is worth remembering that the aim that is
justified here is to remove the harm to those oppressed, not merely to give them or their oppressors better
values. If the goal is to remove oppression-related harms people suffer, this may be next to impossible
without involving their free agency in some way.
With respect to the oppression of women, the responsibility to listen, give credence to and
understand the views of the women concerned is unavoidable. The benefactor must consider what
beneficiaries believe will better or worsen their situation and she has a responsibility to weigh most
seriously what they say about their own lives. A more promising method than pressure is one often used
by international aid organizations: Provide aid directly to women and provide aid that targets twomen's
needs. Increasing women's access to resources is a mechanism to help them overcome their oppression.
This aid is usually not tied to requirements about how the women live or what values they have. Rather, it

to protect themselves or their daughters from FGM. See Timothy Egan, “An Ancient Practice and a
Mother’s Asylum Plea,” The New York Times, March 4, 1994. For a discussion of difficulties suffered by
those who oppose the practice of FGM, including social shunning, see Tina Rosenberg, “Mutilating
Africa’s Daughters: Laws Unenforced, Practices Unchanged,” The New York Times, July 5, 2004.
Rosenberg’s article also states that progress in ending the practice has been made in Mali by local groups
and the involvement of religious leaders.
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decreases their oppression indirectly by increasing their economic and social status.19 When we find
ourselves in the position of a benefactor who has a higher social, economic or political status than those
we try to help, it may be tempting to forget that what constrains the free agency of those who are poor,
uneducated or oppressed is almost always a lack of resources and options, rather than an actual inability
to reflect on their choices. Respect for others' free agency will partly require benefactors to avoid these
biases.
A third problematic effect involves the loss of self-esteem that can result when we depend on
someone else to meet our central needs or ends. This is more likely when we depend on someone who
does not fully respect us. It can be difficult to remain utterly unaffected by the subtle attitudes of someone
who has significant power over our lives but does not hold us in esteem. However, self-esteem can be
affected in conditions of inequality when we are not being actively disrespected, simply as a result of
one's powerlessness in comparison to others, and the inability to act effectively when resources are
absent.
Rawls ties self-respect (self-esteem) to others’ appreciation of one’s individual abilities and
talents and refers to the conception that is of concern here:
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First…it
includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good,
his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s
ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.20
When conditions do not allow people the opportunity to fulfill their intentions (as when resources for
autonomy of action are curtailed), this can erode their confidence in their own agency. Rawls’ inclusion
of the bases of self-respect among the primary goods suggests a concern similar to the one raised here.
Someone’s confidence in her ability to realize her end can be conceived of as a resource or good—
19
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something she needs to carry out her conception of the good. Interference with her ability to use or access
this good interferes not only with her ability to carry out her aims but also with her tendency to make
future plans. The plans we make are shaped by our view that we can realize them. Even the options that
occur to us will narrow considerably when we lose faith in our efficacy as agents.
We have reason to object both to disrespect and to the active undermining of our free agency.
These objections arise in several scenarios. 1. We object to someone who interferes with the result of our
action. 2. We object to someone who interferes with our ability to act and judge freely, for example by
restraining, deceiving or coercing us. 3. We object to someone who interferes with our ability to reflect on
and realize our ends, if, for example, they reduce our efficacy by removing resources we need for future
action, or undermine our self-esteem and thus make us lose confidence in our choices by attitudes of
disrespect. 4. We object when someone creates an atmosphere in which it becomes difficult to choose
rationally or authentically because they cause us to fear losing something of value. The first and second
scenarios tend to be the ones we initially think of as cases where free agency is not being respected or is
being actively undermined. However, what has emerged in the discussion above is that the third and
fourth scenarios can take place within acts of beneficence and may be made worse by the structure of
beneficent relationships that involve dependence.
2. Conditions for Good Beneficence
A well-intentioned benefactor is someone who desires the well-being of the beneficiary and
whose primary intention is to promote that person’s well-being. Two conditions ensure that such a
benefactor performs good beneficence:
(1) The benefactor has genuine respect for the free agency of the beneficiary and intends to
preserve the background conditions necessary for the beneficiary’s continued free agency. This feature is
necessary (but not sufficient) to ensure that an atmosphere of problematic trade-offs does not develop and
that the beneficiary’s self-esteem survives, and he has confidence that he can carry out ends in the future.
(2) Benefactors are morally and practically competent in the choice of means to the beneficiary’s
ends. What is meant here by moral competence is similar to what Aristotle means by phronesis, often
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translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘practical intelligence’ in that both involve the skillful choice of
effective and consistent means to ends.21 Most relevant to beneficence is the capacity to make three kinds
of choices: (a) choose efficient means to the end; (b) choose means that are compatible with the pursuit of
the beneficiary’s other values and ends; and (c) choose means that are compatible with other morally
salient features of the situation, including effects on beneficiaries’ resources or self-esteem.
The first two conditions for good beneficence require choosing means that are likely to bring
about the end, do not have unnecessarily restrictive effects on the beneficiary’s other resources, and do
not create unnecessary conflicts with or undermine the beneficiary’s other ends and values. The means
must therefore fit within the beneficiary’s overall conception of her good. The last condition includes the
sensitivity to perceive and avoid factors that may create an atmosphere of pressure that leads a beneficiary
to change her values or ends to secure beneficence. These two criteria can be mutually supporting: The
ability to convey respect to others also may depend on sensitivity to features of situations that can degrade
or undermine the self-regard of those with whom one interacts. A sensitive person is capable of
recognizing and anticipating her likely effect on others. Here, sensitivity is used in the ordinary sense to
describe a person who is attentive to psychological and emotional facts relevant to her interaction with
others, and whose perception of these facts tends to be accurate. Beneficence involving dependence often,
but not always, involves imbalances of social and economic power and prestige. In such cases, dependent
beneficiaries may be reluctant to speak up for fear of offending or alienating benefactors. In cases where
social, cultural or class differences exist, a benefactor may also need to attend to these differences in order
to better understand the effects that his choices and actions have on beneficiaries. Failure to attend to
these differences was a significant problem for Schweitzer. Such conditions will exist in a variety of cases
of beneficence.
21
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The conditions for good beneficence deserve some analysis, especially from the perspective of
the beneficiary. Respect may seem like an obvious condition for good beneficence, but the respect
needed will demand more of us than the standard attitude of respect we must have towards others.
Respect within beneficent relationships, as described here, naturally involves what we generally owe to
others: recognition of their full moral equality, and acknowledgement of their right to control their own
lives.22 A more demanding standard for respect in beneficent relationships arises however, because our
actions may have a harmful effect on their ability to act freely. To avoid this, we often must understand a
great deal about beneficiaries' lives. Such understanding always requires open communication with
beneficiaries, the ability to understand what they tell us, and a willingness to give credence to their own
understanding of their lives.
There are two reasons beneficence requires more than just a bare acknowledgement that others
have the capacity and the right to reflect and choose freely. Beneficence often takes place when someone
has significant need. In such cases, a person's ability to control her own life may already be compromised
by poverty, injustice and oppression, or other external constraints on her resources. Thus, our effect on
her resources must be carefully weighed. Second, her values and world view may be very different from
our own, and so we must ensure we do not inadvertently impose our values upon her. Respect for free
agency generally requires leaving people alone to control their own lives and let them realize their own
ends. However, if we want to be good benefactors when someone's ability to realize her ends depends on
us, we are required to consider whether there are conditions that prevent her from controlling her own life
so that we do not exacerbate those conditions or otherwise worsen her situation. In some cases, fully
respecting a person includes regretting injustices or other misfortunes that have left her with little power
to act on her own behalf and in significant need. If we fully value another person’s free agency, we will
see as undesirable those things that unjustly threaten it. In beneficence, such attitudes must be
22
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accompanied by actions that prevent unnecessary constraints on her deliberation or action as the result of
our own actions. Understanding prior constraints on people’s lives will be relevant to this effort. Failure
to recognize relevant background conditions and constraints that affect the results of our action, for
example, oppression, psychological effects of prior political and social violence, illness, or cultural norms
greatly increases the likelihood that our action will be inappropriate or harmful.
In many cases, the agent herself has no significant power to change the fundamental conditions
that hamper the beneficiary. The goal is at least to ensure that the agent’s help does not worsen people's
current situation or unnecessarily constrain their options. It may demand too much of a benefactor to
promote the free agency of beneficiaries by removing any unnecessary obstacles to their future action. It
is a good thing to provide a limited benefit, e.g., in the form of material aid, as long as those benefits do
not inadvertently worsen the person's situation. Still, the obstacles to a person's ability to control her life
are sometimes a better target for beneficence than aid that meets physical needs alone. When benefactors
can see the ways that a person's good is impaired by outside constraints she cannot herself address, they
may be better able discover what the beneficiary most needs. For example, political or social
empowerment can be as conducive to someone's long-term good as material aid.23
The aspect of respect that attends to someone's need to control her own life is one reason why
unconscious biases, even on the part of well-meaning benefactors, can so impair the ability to act well.
One such attitude is to (perhaps unconsciously) blame beneficiaries for their difficulties or to see relative
powerlessness as casting doubt on their right to control their own lives. Of course, some beneficiaries
might be partly to blame for their difficulties, but almost never does this remove their right to control their
own lives. Avoiding such biases does have a performative aspect. Wherever possible, beneficiaries should
try to place those they help into a relationship of actual equality, at least in the context of communication.
Thus, they must avoid inadvertently intimidating beneficiaries or otherwise keeping them from speaking
on their own behalf. If you intend to help people, they should have some sense of control over the actions
23
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you perform. Clearly, they should be able to forbid you from choosing means to ends that are contrary to
their values (which would be paternalistic in any case); you are also under some (limited) burden to at
least consider providing help they might desire more than the help you are offering.
The second condition for good beneficence is moral and practical competence. Most wellintentioned attempts at beneficence deserve praise, even when not ideal. Even so, we must admit that acts
of beneficence can be better or worse or can fail altogether. You are better off if I prevent your starvation
through my famine relief program. But if I flood your region with so much cheap grain that it undermines
the local economy, I can threaten not only your future ability to support yourself but also your range of
choices later.
It's worth asking what beneficiaries can do to protect themselves. The idea that benefactors will
choose harmful means to meet someone's self-chosen ends might lead us to ask whether beneficiaries
could more effectively control the help that benefactors provide. Suppose that contractual or quasicontractual arrangements clearly stating the terms of the help were possible. Would these protect
beneficiaries? One reason these would be of little use to beneficiaries is that effective contracts require
sanctions. Further, when we count on the benefactor’s greater knowledge or competence in certain
spheres, we often cannot assess beforehand whether he will act competently. In rare cases, we can closely
direct the help we receive, but we will nearly always have to trust, or at least rely on, our benefactor.24
Thus, even if contracts were practical, they would not prevent harmful beneficence. Often, we cannot
precisely set out what it is we want a benefactor to do for us because we need the benefactor’s expertise.
We may also develop a long-term relationship with a benefactor who must be authorized to work
independently (as was true in the Schweitzer case) and we cannot begin each day laying out constraints
on the benefactor’s action. In general, beneficiaries must rely on benefactors’ knowledge, ability and
24
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competence to choose well. A benefactor often has access to things of great value to beneficiaries, and
they usually cannot absolutely guarantee by their own actions that the benefactor’s actions will conform
to their values or result in something that promotes their good.
In addition, benefactors often have to act independently and without consultation; in doing so
they can unintentionally interfere with, undermine or disrespect free agency. Although non-paternalistic
benefactors do not choose the end, it may be necessary for them to choose the means to the end. For
example, Mary has a young son and has long been trying to arrange a more flexible schedule so she can
spend more time with him. However, her boss, Ted, dislikes Mary, regards her as a troublemaking
feminist, and refuses to allow her to alter her schedule. Suppose that Lou, Mary’s good friend, is much
better at negotiating with Ted than Mary is. Lou offers to intercede for Mary. He comes back and tells her
that Ted has reconsidered; Mary can leave the office by 3:00 P.M. each day provided she remains in
phone contact.
Mary is delighted. However, when Lou recounts his conversation with Ted, Mary realizes that
Lou primarily appealed to Ted’s sexism by emphasizing that Mary is on the verge of being an inadequate
mother by working in the first place. Mary is particularly distressed because she realizes Ted’s new
perspective on her may mean she is even less likely to get the challenging work assignments she craves or
a promotion to a position with greater responsibility. Lou was well-meaning but failed to account for
Mary’s other ends and the way these are now affected by the means he has chosen. Mary could not have
told Lou how to negotiate with Ted, as the ability to relate to Ted is the very thing she lacks. She could
not have chosen the precise means to her end. At the same time, Lou’s choice of means was not apt. In
this case Mary’s overall free agency is not greatly compromised—but some of her other ends have been
jeopardized and her options will now be much more limited.
The example shows that the character and competence of benefactors unavoidably play a
significant role in good beneficence. Benefactors need skill in realizing ends but also must be able to see
how those means fit within beneficiaries’ outlook and conception of the good. Choosing the right means
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depends on having reliably good judgment in the situation and in attending to other elements in the
beneficiary’s conception of her good.
That beneficiaries must depend on benefactors to choose the means to their ends raises several
problems. First, the benefactor may choose inexact or inapt means to the beneficiary’s end. But two cases
can be even more significant. In the first case, the benefactor chooses means that conflict with other
significant ends in the beneficiary’s conception of her good. In the second, the benefactor chooses means
that undermine resources the beneficiary needs to pursue her other ends in the future.
In the Schweitzer case, bringing about a beneficiary’s self-chosen ends was not sufficient for
good beneficence. Schweitzer provided the Gabonese with things they clearly valued: control of disease,
better health, access to food, and basic education. But the help he offered conflicted with their other ends
and values, such as eliminating colonialism or developing their own medical and technical skills—so he
may have worsened their future prospects. His actions are objectionable not only because some of his
actions inadvertently conflicted with his beneficiaries’ values and ends; he also undermined their
confidence and other resources crucial to their ability to act on choices in the future. And he
unintentionally disrespected them by giving them the impression that they could secure his continued help
by conforming their values and actions to his apparent preferences. A deep attitude of respect is a
powerful motivation to take up the challenge of trying to learn enough about others to prevent one’s
attempts to help from having harmful side effects. Unfortunately, some people who care deeply about
promoting others’ good are practically inept, and unable to choose the better option in complex
circumstances. (One kind of competence that might still be useful for such people is the ability to see that
you are not the right person for the job.) It is easy for benevolent and kind agents to harm others
inadvertently, particularly if those others have markedly different life circumstances or world views.25
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they provide is partly an attempt to avoid the common mistakes of beneficence. When individuals
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This is sometimes a benign problem when we help people with substantial resources to meet their own
ends, but the results for vulnerable beneficiaries can be tragic.
Because I have shown that the responsibility of benefactors to prevent harm to beneficiaries can
be substantial, we might worry this will weaken the motivation for beneficence. Many people’s wellbeing depends on second-order beneficence, primarily in the form of donations to agencies, advocacy
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It’s not hard to imagine a casual
philanthropist concluding, ‘if I have to do all that work, then forget it.’ People's interest in such distant
beneficence, particularly toward the most vulnerable, can be weak. Judith Lichtenberg offers many
reasons why people do not give, including the fact that distance causes the suffering of others to become
abstract to us.26 Further, she argues, the language of moral obligation “sticks in people's craw,” which
suggests that adding to their obligation might deter them further.27 This would be troubling, given that so
many people depend, indirectly, on the help that donations make possible.28
However, casual second-order beneficence brings with it a much lighter responsibility than direct
engagement in beneficent relationships. A second-order benefactor’s own actions do not impede a
beneficiary's ability to deliberate and they are not directly involved in choosing the means. The
beneficiaries are unlikely to be aware of the donors’ attitudes towards them and their deliberation and
choices are affected very indirectly by the donors’ actions, which merely make the direct benefactor’s
actions possible.
Nevertheless, such donors do have some responsibilities to those who depend indirectly on their
donations because the donation may facilitate beneficence that may harm others. As always, what they
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ought to do depends on what they can do. In most cases, people engaged in secondary giving can look
carefully at how a given organization conceives of its work and consider whether it shows both a high
degree of respect for those it intends to benefit and an appropriate level of concern for its effects on them.
Organizations such as Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, Partners in Health, Human Rights Watch and
many others make a significant amount of material available to potential donors. It does not place a great
burden on us to read that material before deciding to donate. Donors can also consult with reliable, wellinformed people (e.g., those who engage in direct beneficence in the relevant area or those knowledgeable
about the region or issue) about where to put their money.
Further, second-order benefactors can avoid being paternalistic or pitying as they think of the
poor or vulnerable that their donations are intended to benefit, as such thinking denies people’s agency.
These attitudes about the poor proliferate mostly because of the way poverty is presented to us and our
distance from the poor, so some potential donors may need further education to let go of such attitudes.
Those who are worse off still have views about how they want to live their lives, and these must be
respected, even if such thinking dissuades people who would be more strongly motivated by pity. The
best aid organizations, for example, present the people they help as distinct individuals rather than mere
objects of pity. Wanting to ensure that the work one is supporting increases people's ability to control
their lives and lead a life they would choose does motivate many potential donors to look closely at the
organizations they support.
Does increasing the second-order donor's responsibility even this much deter people from giving?
To answer this question, consider two people. The first would be the person who is already concerned
about helping the poor, the vulnerable or others who are unable to satisfy their ends without help. Such a
person is unlikely to be dissuaded by the responsibility to make a reasonable inquiry to see that her
money is doing good, rather than harm. A second sort of person may want to give but guilt or other
discomfort keeps her from thinking for long about the conditions of people's lives or their suffering. There
might be some reason for NGOs to try to reduce this person’s discomfort or otherwise make it easy for
them to donate. However, this does not mean we also must let them off the moral hook entirely. Although
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people like these may do some good through their donations, they do so primarily by accident and are
evading a rather undemanding moral responsibility. Further, it may matter less than we might think if
people do not give when the result is that bad philanthropies are deprived of donations. If casual
philanthropists give to organizations that are utterly unconcerned about the free agency of the recipients
of their donations, those recipients may ultimately not benefit much from that organization’s work or may
be harmed by it.29
3. Conclusion
My argument has been that the conditions for good beneficence include more than the goodwill
and good intention of benefactors. Even a benefactor’s success at bringing about the ends a beneficiary
has chosen may be insufficient for good beneficence. Success at realizing the beneficiary’s ends is
insufficient when that benefactor chooses means that thwart or are incompatible with other elements in
the beneficiary’s conception of her good, undermine resources needed for future autonomy, or show
disrespect for the beneficiary. Even so, I concede that in certain pressing cases, some beneficence will be
better than no beneficence. You may be better off if I save your life while also undermining your ability
to pursue your future ends or if I disrespect you but give you something you desperately need. Even when
the benefactor is disrespectful or incompetent, the benefit to the beneficiary can outweigh the harm.
However, harmful beneficence is only sometimes better than no beneficence at all and it is
equally possible that, in the long run, harms even to very needy beneficiaries will outweigh benefits.
Although it can sometimes be better for a person to receive harmful beneficence, we cannot be sanguine
about the problems it raises. One reason why the benefit will sometimes outweigh the harm lies in
individuals’ very dire need for assistance, particularly in situations of deprivation and injustice. Those in
great need must sometimes accept beneficence even when they know harms will accompany it.
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Substantially free agency may be a luxury some may relinquish when the help they receive is better than
nothing. This is not a happy result though, and we should not be satisfied with it. We should be no more
comfortable with a benefactor who unnecessarily undermines a beneficiary’s free agency than we are with
a doctor who amputates an infected limb when antibiotics alone would have saved it. Even in emergency
situations, e.g., where saving someone's life does not leave time to consider her existing resources or her
conception of her good, her eventual need for free agency cannot be fully set aside, but only temporarily
overridden. Our moral standard for beneficence, like our medical standard for good care, should represent
a set of ‘best practices’ even if we relax our standards in urgent cases.
Respect and competence are the primary agent-dependent conditions for good beneficence. Not
every potential beneficent agent is able to satisfy these conditions. Some elements of competence may lie
outside the will. And, although a basic attitude of respect for others is a minimum moral requirement on
us, the significant effect we can have on beneficiaries’ ability to choose and act freely requires more than
mentally acknowledging the fact that they have the right to control their own lives. To prevent harm to
others within beneficent relationships, full respect for others’ free agency requires us to understand their
lives and to act in ways that adequately reflect this understanding. We are familiar with the very real
worry that far too many people are indifferent to the well-being of others. I have argued for a more
unexpected worry: Some people are unwilling or unable to sufficiently understand the circumstances and
perspective of others and, when this is the case, even those with a deep desire to do good are likely to do
unwitting harm. This argument here suggests that the desire to help is not precisely the opposite of
indifference. Someone who genuinely desires to benefit another can still display a kind of indifference to
that person’s free agency and in doing so, may neglect what is most important to the person herself.30
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